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Abstract
We consider an optimal dividend and capital structure problem for a firm which
holds a certain amount of debt to which is associated a financial-ratio covenant between
the creditors and the firm. We study optimal policies under a bankruptcy framework
using a mixed reduced and structural approach in modelling default and liquidation
times. Once in default, the firm is given a grace period during which it may inject
more capital to correct the situation. The firm is liquidated if, by the end of the grace
period, assets do not exceed the debt.
Under this setup, we maximize the discounted amount of dividends distributed mi-
nus the capital injected up to the time of bankruptcy. It gives rise to a two-dimensional
singular control problem leading to a non-standard system of variational inequalities.
Beyond the usual viscosity characterization, we completely solve this problem and ob-
tain a description of the continuation, dividend and capital injection regions enabling
us to fully characterize the optimal policies. We conclude the paper with numerical
results and illustrations.
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1 Introduction
We consider an optimal dividend and capital structure problem for a firm which holds a
certain amount of debt to which is associated a financial-ratio covenant between the creditors
and the firm. To be more precise, we study dividend and issuance of equity policies under
a new bankruptcy framework.
The theory of capital structure is at the center of corporate finance problems. A firm’s
capital structure is an inherent feature of many mathematical models of credit risk and
optimal dividend and investment problems. Made popular by Merton [19], the structural
approach to credit risk consists in modelling the dynamics of a firm’s assets and debts,
and making assumptions about the default and liquidation mechanism. The Merton model
assumes a very simple debt design that consists of a single bond with a fixed maturity. The
firm defaults if its assets are lower than the face value of the debt at the time of maturity.
Black and Cox [2] extended this model by considering the debt structure which allows default
at any time before maturity. Under the above and simple definition of a firm’s default, the
objective of both Merton [19] and Black and Cox [2] is to study the firm’s credit risk, in
particular the pricing of its debt and its enterprise value.
It is under this simple capital structure framework that most optimal dividend and
investment problems have so far been investigated. For instance, Jeanblanc and Shiryaev
[11], Asmussen and Taksar [1], Choulli et al. [6], Choulli et al. [7], Sethi and Taksar [21],
Décamps and Villeneuve [9], Ly Vath et al. [17], Jin et al. [12], and Chevalier et al. [5]
assume that the firm goes bankrupt and ceases operations when its cash reserves (as a proxy
for the firm’s assets) hits zero. In other words, the level of debt held by a firm is assumed
to be zero.
Jeanblanc and Shiryaev [11] and Asmussen and Taksar [1] are among the first studies on
optimal dividend policy and consider a stochastic process which represents the cash reserves
of the firm. Since then, many studies on dividend policy have been carried solely or in com-
bination with other control problems such as investment policies. Choulli et al. [7] propose
a model in which a firm must decide between different production options with differing
expected returns, with restrictions on dividend rates. Décamps and Villeneuve [9] and Ly
Vath et al. [17] study the interactions between dividend policies and investment decisions
in a growth opportunity and under uncertainty whereas Chevalier et al. [5] considers an
optimal dividend and investment problem under liquidity constraints.
Chevalier et al. [4] consider a more complex debt structure in which the manager may
decide to incur more debt at the cost of higher interest rates. Once again, they assume
that the firm defaults and gets liquidated when the cash reserves fall below the current debt
level, which is, however, no longer assumed to be zero. Other studies focus on the combined
optimal dividend and issuance of equity problem, see for instance Lokka and Zervos [16], Z.
Jin et al. [14], Z. Jin and G. Yin [13], and Keppo and Peura [15].
As stated earlier, all the above discussed studies assume that when a firm’s assets value
reach its debt level, the firm goes bankrupt and gets liquidated. However, in practice, the
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liquidation of a firm is a more complex event. For instance, Makarov et al. [18], and Yildirim
[22] price defaultable bonds in a setup in which the liquidation mechanism assumes that the
firm’s assets must first cross a default threshold and then spend a cumulative amount of
time below that barrier in order for the bondholders to be allowed to step in and liquidate
the firm. This distinction between default time and liquidation time may be best illustrated
by the US bankruptcy code and its Chapters 11 and 7, see for instance Broadie et al. [3].
Indeed, firms may file for protection from liquidation under Chapter 11 and get a grace
period to restructure its debts and activities. Chapter 7, i.e. liquidation, is only triggered
when the company has not managed to get itself out of default during the allowed time.
In this paper, we are assuming a similar standard bankruptcy process which distinguishes
default and liquidation times in the study of our optimal dividend and issuance of equity
problem. We consider a firm that holds a certain amount of debt to which is associated a
financial-ratio covenant between the creditors and the firm. We assume that the firm may
get into default when it is under financial distress, i.e., when its debt-to-assets ratio is less
than one. Once in default, the firm is given a grace period during which it can inject more
capital to correct the situation. The firm is liquidated if, by the end of the grace period,
assets do not exceed the debt. Moreover, as part of the debt covenants, the firm can only
pay out dividends to stockholders when its debt-to-assets ratio is less than one. However,
in the modelling of default time, we do not consider the usual structural approach as in
Broadie et al [3], Makarov et al. [18], and Yildirim [22] which assume that default occurs
exactly at the time when an underlying process hits a bound, i.e. the very moment when
the firm goes under financial distress. In our study, we consider a reduced model for default
which occurs at the first jump of a counting process once an underlying process representing
the firm’s assets value is below a threshold D corresponding to the firm’s debt level. In
our case, default time is no longer predictable as required in most credit risk models. Our
liquidation time is still based on structural model and occurs when the firm’s assets value
hits zero or has not reached the upper threshold D before the end of the grace period.
Our objective is to study a dividend and issuance of equity problem under this new frame-
work using a mixed reduced and structural approach in modelling default and liquidation
times. To our knowledge, this approach is the first attempt to study optimal dividend and
issuance of equity while incorporating such complex capital structure constraints. In terms
of mathematical modelling, this gives rise to a two-dimensional singular control problem
leading to an atypical and non-standard system of variational inequalities. It is well-known
that two-dimensional non-degenerated singular control problems are a major challenge when
one expects to get beyond the usual viscosity characterization and obtain a full qualitative
description of the optimal policies. This is precisely the results we obtained, a complete
description of the continuation, dividend and capital injection regions enabling us to fully
describe the optimal policies. This complete qualitative description of different regions may
only be obtained by introducing an optimal stopping time on a related reflected diffusion
process. Solving this optimal stopping-time problem allows us to characterize the optimal
issuance of capital policy during the grace period.
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In the next section, we present the model and some basic properties. In Section 3,
we show that the value function is the unique continuous viscosity solution of a system
of variational inequalities. In Section 4, we describe the regions of the domain where it
is optimal to inject capital and payout dividends. We conclude the paper with numerical
illustrations in Section 5.
2 The model and first properties of the value function
The firm holds a fixed amount of debt D ≥ 0. Associated to this debt are covenants between
the creditors and the firm. We consider a debt covenant based on the firm’s debt to total
assets ratio. Under this debt covenant, the firm’s financial statement may be audited at any
time. If the financial ratio constraint is not satisfied, the firm is declared under default and
a grace period starts. Creditors then declare the firm bankruptcy at the end of the grace
period if the situation has not improved which means that the ratio constraint has not been
satisfied and the default still uncleared before the end of the grace period.
2.1 The model
Under the total assets ratio, the firm is in financial difficulty when the total value of its
asset at time t, denoted by Xt, is less than D, the value of the debt. The firm can increase
its capital at any time by issuing more equity, including during a grace period in order to
decrease its debt to asset ratio to less than 1. However, the firm is not allowed to borrow
more at this time to increase assets since this action would also increase the debt level. On
the other hand, the firm can pay out dividends when it is not in financial distress. The
cumulative sum that has been injected into the firm at time t is denoted by Kt, whereas the
total amount of dividends paid up to time t is Zt.
When the firm is in financial distress, it may go to default at any time. The probability that
a default occurs in the time interval [t, t+dt) is λdt, with λ > 0. In other words, the default
time is given by the first jump of a Poisson process N with intensity λ. The firm enters a
grace period if Xt < D at the default time. When the firm is under default, bankruptcy is
defined in terms of a grace period of δ units of time. In other words, the firm is declared
bankrupt when it has spent a continual period of time δ in financial distress from the last
default time or if the value of its assets hits zero (which can happen even if the firm is not
currently declared under default). As such, we introduce the default process defined as
dIt = 1l{Xt<D}(1− It)dNt − Itd1l{Xt≥D}. (2.1)
The default indicator equals 1 when the firm is under default, and 0 otherwise. The process
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X is assumed to satisfy the following stochastic differential equation:
dXt = µ(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dWt + (1− κIt)dKt − (1 + κ′)dZt, (2.2)
with κ0 ≤ κ1, κ′ constants in (0, 1). The constants κ0, κ1 and κ′ respectively represent
proportional costs that must be paid to inject capital in favorable and unfavorable cases
and to payout dividends. The functions µ and σ defined on R are deterministic, Lipschitz
continuous, and satisfy the following linear growth assumption:
| µ(x) | + | σ(x) |≤ C(1+ | x |). (2.3)
We also define the duration Ξt that X has spent under D since the last time before t that
the firm went to default:
Ξt = Ξ01l{inf{s≤t:Is=0}>δ−Ξ0} + t− sup{s ≤ t : Is = 0}, (2.4)
with the convention sup ∅ = 0 and inf ∅ = +∞. The dynamic of Ξ is the following
dΞt = 1l{It=1}dt+ Ξt−dIt. (2.5)
The bankruptcy time is given by
T = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt < 0 or Ξt > δ}. (2.6)
We define the state space (with a slight abuse of notation) as S = S0 ∪ S1, with
S0 = [0,+∞) and S1 = [0, δ]× [0, D]. (2.7)
The firm is in financial distress and under default (It = 1) when (Ξt, Xt) ∈ S1\({0} × [0, D)) .
Note that when (Ξt, Xt) ∈ {0} × [0, D) both It = 1 and It = 0 are possible.
Value functions of the optimization problem are then respectively defined by
v0(x) := sup
(Z,K)∈A
Ex,0
∫ T
0
e−ρs d(Zs −Ks), x ∈ S0, (2.8)
v1(ς, x) := sup
(Z,K)∈A
Eς,x,1
∫ T
0
e−ρs d(Zs −Ks), (ς, x) ∈ S1, (2.9)
when the firm is not under default (I = 0) and when it is under default (I = 1).
Here, ρ > 0 is a discount rate, Eς,x,i is the conditional expectation given that X0− = x,
Ξ0 = ς and I0− = i (ς is omitted when the firm is not under default), and
A = {(Z,K) ∈ I2F : ∀t ≥ 0, Zt − Zt− ≤ (Xt− −D)+ and
∫ +∞
0
1l{It=1}dZt = 0}
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is the set of admissible dividend and capital injection policies. IF denotes the set of non
decreasing and F-predictable processes. We also use the notation
A0 = {K : (Z,K) ∈ A, Z ≡ 0}.
2.2 Upper bound for the value function
Throughout the paper, we make the following standing assumption:
sup
x≥0
(µ(x)− ρx) < +∞.
This condition will guarantee that the value of the firm is finite as in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.1. For any x ≥ 0, we set f(x) := x
1+κ′
+ 1
ρ
supx≥0(µ(x)− ρx), and we have
v0(x) ≤ f(x) on S0 and v1(ς, x) ≤ f(x) on S1.
Proof: We introduce an arbitrary control α = (Z,K) ∈ A. For m > 0, we set
θm = inf{t ≥ 0 : Ξt ≥ δ −
1
m
, or Xt ≤ 1/m}.
Notice that θm ↗ T a.s. when m goes to infinity. We apply Itô’s formula to (e−ρtf(Xt))t≥0
between 0 and θm :
e−ρθmf(Xθm) = f(X0) +
∫ θm
0
e−ρt(Lf − ρf)(Xt) dt−
∫ θm
0
e−ρtf ′(Xt)d(Z
c
t −Kct )
+
∑
0≤t≤θm
e−ρt [f(Xt)− f(Xt−)] +
∫ θm
0
e−ρtσ(Xt)f
′(Xt)dBt.
where Lf(x) := σ(x)
2
2
∂2f
∂x2
+ µ(x)∂f
∂x
, Zc and Kc are the continuous parts of Z and K.
As f(x) := x
1+κ′
+ C where C := 1
ρ
supx≥0(µ(x)− ρx), we have
e−ρθmf(Xθm) = f(X0) +
1
1 + κ′
∫ θm
0
e−ρt(µ(Xt)− ρXt − ρC) dt
− 1
1 + κ′
∫ θm
0
e−ρtd((1 + κ′)Zct − (1− κI0)Kct )
+
1
1 + κ′
∑
0≤t≤θm
e−ρt [Xt −Xt− ]
+
1
1 + κ′
∫ θm
0
e−ρtσ(Xt)dBt.
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As κ′, κ0, and κ1 > 0, by taking expectation in the above equation, we get
E
[
e−ρθmf(Xθm)
]
≤ f(X0)− E
[∫ θm
0
e−ρtd(Zt −Kt)
]
.
Recall that f(y) ≥ 0, by sending m to infinity, it follows from Fatou’s lemma that:
f(X0) ≥ E
[∫ T
0
e−ρtd(Zt −Kt) + e−ρTf(XT )
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
e−ρtd(Zt −Kt)
]
(2.10)
As this is true for any initial state (I0,Ξ0, X0) and any arbitrary control (Z,K) ∈ A. This
concludes the proof.

2.3 Dynamic programming
We start this section with the introduction of a notation that will be used throughout the
paper.
Hitting times: For y ∈ [0, D], we define the hitting times
θy,− = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ y} and θy,+ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ y}. (2.11)
In this setting, the dynamic programming principle (DPP) that we shall use is the following:
Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP):
Let τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : It = 1} be the first default time. For all stopping times ν and all x ∈ S0,
we have the following dynamic programming principle for v0:
v0(x) = sup(Z,K)∈A Ex,0
[ ∫ ν∧τ∧T
0
e−ρs d(Zs −Ks) +e−ρνv0(Xν)1l{ν<τ∧T} (2.12)
+e−ρτv1(0, Xτ )1l{τ≤ν∧T}
]
.
For all (ς, x) ∈ S1 and stopping times ν taking values in [0, δ − ς], we have the following
dynamic programming principle for v1:
v1(ς, x) = sup(Z,K)∈A Eς,x,1
[
−
∫ ν∧θD,+∧T
0
e−ρt dKt +e
−ρνv1(Ξν , Xν)1l{ν<T∧θD,+} (2.13)
+e−ρθ
D,+
v0(XθD,+)1l{θD,+≤T∧ν}
]
.
Remark 2.1. Note that {θD,+ = T} = ∅ and v1(δ, x) = g(x), where we have set
g(x) := max(v0(D)− (D − x)/(1− κ1), 0), on [0, D]. (2.14)
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Indeed, for x ∈ [0, D], one could issue capital up to D or go to bankruptcy, so we obviously
have v1(δ, x) ≥ g(x). Moreover, equation (2.13) gives that
v1(δ, x) = max
(
sup
a≥0
[
− a+ v0 (D + (1− κ1)a)
]
− D − x
1− κ1
; 0
)
≤ max
(
sup
a≥0
[
− a+ v0(D) +
1− κ1
1− κ0
a
]
− D − x
1− κ1
; 0
)
= max
(
v0(D)−
D − x
1− κ1
; 0
)
= g(x).
Under default, we guess that, when it is optimal to clear the default, capital has to be issued
up to D and not more. Indeed when default is cleared the cost of issuing new capital is then
lower. Consequently, we now prove that we can restrict the set of admissible strategies to
these strategies. The following Corollary of the DPP states that if default is cleared at time
t before Ξt = δ, we can assume that Xt = D.
Corollary 2.1. For all (ς, x) ∈ S1 and stopping times ν,
v1(ς, x) = ṽ1(ς, x) := sup
K∈A0
Eς,x,1
[
−
∫ (ν∧θD,+∧T )−
0
e−ρtdKt − e−ρν∆Kν1l{ν<T∧θD,+∧(δ−ς)}
+e−ρνv1(Ξν , Xν)1l{ν<T∧θD,+∧(δ−ς)} + e
−ρνg(Xν−)1l{ν=(δ−ς)∧θD,+<T}
]
.
Note that, starting from (ς, x) ∈ S1, we have Ξν = ν + ς on {ν < T ∧ θD,+ ∧ (δ − ς)}.
Proof: On [0, D], we havev0(x) ≤ v0(D) + (x − D)/(1 − κ0) ≤ v0(D) + (x − D)/(1 − κ1).
Hence, by Equation 2.13, on S1, v1 is less or equal to ṽ1.
For any K ∈ A0, consider the strategy K̃ such that K̃s = Ks for all s < δ − ς, and
K̃s =

Kδ−ς − (X(δ−ς) −D)+/(1− κ1), if s = δ − ς,
KθD,+ − (XθD,+ −D)/(1− κ1), if s = θD,+,
Ks, otherwise.
Then, (Z, K̃) ∈ A and, if we denote by X̃ the process X controlled by K̃, T̃ its bankruptcy
time and θ̃D,+ its associated hitting time of D. Notice that we have θ̃D,+ = θD,+ and T̃ = T .
Therefore, we have
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v1(ς, x) ≥ E
[
−
∫ ν∧θ̃D,+∧T̃
0
e−ρtdK̃t + e
−ρνv1(Ξν , X̃ν)1l{ν<T̃∧θ̃D,+} + e
−ρθ̃D,+v0(X̃θ̃D,+)1l{θ̃D,+<T̃∧ν}
]
= E
[
−
∫ (ν∧θD,+∧T )−
0
e−ρtdKt − e−ρν(∆Kν − v1(Ξν , Xν))1l{ν<T∧θD,+∧(δ−ς)}
+e−ρ(θ
D,+∧(δ−ς))g(XθD,+∧(δ−ς))1l{θD,+∧(δ−ς)<T∧ν}
]
.
Therefore, v1(ς, x) ≥ ṽ1(ς, x). 
2.4 Analytical properties of the value functions
In this section, we study the limit of the value function on the domain boundaries, establish
some monotonicity results and prove that the value functions are continuous.
Proposition 2.2. The function v1 satisfies the following limits on the boundary of S1:
i) limh↓0 supx∈[0,D] |v1(δ − h, x)− v1(δ, x)| = 0, and v1(δ, x) = g(x), for all 0 ≤ x ≤ D,
ii) limh↓0 v1(ς,D − h) = v0(D) = v1(ς,D) for all 0 ≤ ς ≤ δ,
iii) limh↓0 v1(ς, h) exists for all 0 ≤ ς ≤ δ.
Proof: We first note that g(x) ≤ v1(ς, x) on S1. Indeed, if x > D−v0(D)(1−κ1), we consider
a strategy K such that ∆K0 = (D − x)/(1− κ1) and obtain
v1(ς, x) ≥ −∆K0 + v0(x+ (1− κ1)∆K0) = −(D − x)/(1− κ1) + v0(D) = g(x).
Otherwise, if x < D − v0(D)(1− κ1), g(x) = 0, and obviously v1(ς, x) ≥ g(x).
Let 0 < h < δ and 0 < ε < x. Define ν = h∧ θD,+∧ θε,−. From Corollary 2.1, it follows that
v1(δ − h, x) = sup
(Z,K)∈A
E
[
−
∫ ν−
0
e−ρtdKt − e−ρν(∆Kν − v1(Ξν , Xν))1l{ν=θε,−<h∧θD,+}
+e−ρθ
D,+
g(D)1l{θD,+≤h∧θε,−} + e
−ρhg(Xh)1l{h<θD,+}
]
.
Hence, if we define the process X̃ := (D ∧Xt)t≥0 and set
ṽh(x) = sup
K∈A0
Eδ−h,x
[
e−ρν(−Kν + g(X̃ν) + v1(Ξθε,− , ε)1l{ν=θε,−<h∧θD,+})
]
,
we obviously have that v1(δ − h, x) ≤ ṽh(x). Also, it is clear that g(x) ≤ ṽh(x).
It only remains to show that ṽh(x) converges to g(x) uniformly in x, as h → 0. In order to
do so, first note that
g(X̃ν)−Kν ≤ g(x+
∫ ν
0
(µ(Xs)ds+ σ(Xs)dWs)).
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Consequently, it follows from Proposition (2.1) that there exists C > 0 such that
ṽh(x) ≤ sup
K∈A0
E
[
g(x+
∫ ν
0
(µ(Xs)ds+ σ(Xs)dWs)) + C1l{ν=θε,−<h}
]
≤ g(x) + 1
1− κ1
sup
K∈A0
E
∣∣∣ ∫ ν
0
(µ(Xs)ds+ σ(Xs)dWs)) + C1l{ν=θε,−<h}
∣∣∣.
It follows from the linear growth assumption (2.3) that sups |µ(Xs)|+ |σ(Xs)| is finite since
Xs < D for all s < ν. Sending h→ 0, we find
lim
h→0
sup
x∈[0,D]
|ṽh(x)− g(x)| = lim
h→0
sup
x∈[0,D]
sup
K∈A0
P(θε,− < h) = 0,
by standard SDE bounds. Concluding, the inequality
lim
h↓0
sup
x∈[0,D]
|v1(δ − h, x)− v1(δ, x)| ≤ lim
h↓0
sup
x∈[0,D]
|ṽh(x)− g(x)|
and the fact that g(x) = v1(δ, x) give the desired result.
We skip the proof of the second limit as it could be done similarly.
To prove that limx↓0 v1(ς, x) exists, note that for x ≤ y < D
v1(ς, x) ≥ sup
(Z,K)∈A :∆K0=(y−x)/(1−κ1)
Eς,x,1
(∫ T
0
e−ρs(dZs − dKs)
)
= −(y − x)/(1− κ1) + sup
(Z,K)
Eς,y,1
(∫ T
0
e−ρs(dZs − dKs)
)
= −(y − x)/(1− κ1) + v1(ς, y). (2.15)
Consequently, the function y → v1(ς, y − y1−κ1 is non increasing on [0, D]. Especially, this
gives that v1(ς, 0+) exists. 
Proposition 2.3. For any x ∈ [0, D], the function v1(·, x) is non-increasing on [0, δ] and
for any ς ∈ [0, δ], the functions v0 and v1(ς, ·) are non-decreasing respectively on [0, D] and
R+.
Proof: For x ∈ R+, we denote by Xx the unique strong solution of equation (2.2) such that
Xx0 = x. We also set T
x = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt < 0} and θD,+x := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ D}
Monotonicity of v1(ς, ·). Let ς ∈ [0, δ], 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ D and notice that θD,+x ≥ θD,+y . If we
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set ν = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt = X
y
t } ∧ θD,+y , from equation (2.13), we have
v1(ς, x) = sup
(Z,K)∈A
Eς,x,1
[
−
∫ ν∧Tx
0
e−ρt dKt + e
−ρνv1(Ξν , X
x
ν )1l{ν<Tx}
]
≤ sup
(Z,K)∈A
Eς,x,1
[
−
∫ ν∧Tx
0
e−ρt dKt + e
−ρνv1(Ξν , X
y
ν )1l{ν<Tx}
]
≤ v1(ς, y),
because ν ∧ T x ≤ ν ∧ T y and Xxt = X
y
t on {t ≥ ν}.
Monotonicity of v0. It is clear that, as distribution of dividends is allowed for X greater
than D, we have v0(y) ≥ v0(x) + (y − x)/(1 + κ′) ≥ v0(x) for any D ≤ x ≤ y. Now, let
0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ D and set again ν = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt = X
y
t } ∧ θD,+y . From equation (2.12), the
prohibiting of dividend distribution below D and the monotonicity of v1(0, ·), we have
v0(x) = sup
(Z,K)∈A
Ex,0
[ ∫ ν∧τ∧Tx
0
e−ρs d(Zs −Ks) + e−ρνv0(Xxν )1l{ν<τ∧Tx}
+e−ρτv1(0, X
x
τ )1l{τ≤ν∧Tx}
]
.
≤ sup
K∈A0
Ex,0
[
−
∫ ν∧τ∧Tx
0
e−ρs dKs + e
−ρνv0(X
y
ν )1l{ν<τ∧T}
+e−ρτv1(0, X
y
τ )1l{τ≤ν∧Tx}
]
.
≤ v0(y).
Monotonicity in duration. Let x ∈ [0, D] and 0 ≤ ς1 < ς2 < δ. Let ε > 0. By re-writing the
dynamic programming principle (Corollary 2.1), we know that there exists K∗ ∈ A0 such
that, if we set θ = θD,+ ∧ T, (associated to the pair (Ξ, X) started at Ξ0 = ς2 and X0 = x)
then we have
v1(ς2, x) ≤ Eς2,x,1
[(
−
∫ θ
0
e−ρtdK∗t + e
−ρθD,+v0(D)
)
1l{θ<δ−ς2}
]
(2.16)
+Eς2,x,1
[(
−
∫ (δ−ς2)−
0
e−ρtdK∗t + e
−ρ(δ−ς2)g(Xδ−ς2)
)
1l{θ=δ−ς2}
]
+ ε.
If we apply the same strategy, up to time δ − ς2, to the pair (Ξ, X) starting from the
state (ς1, x) and then issue capital up to D at time δ − ς2, we obtain
v1(ς1, x) ≥ Eς2,x,1
[(
−
∫ θ
0
e−ρtdK∗t + e
−ρθD,+v0(D)
)
1l{θ<δ−ς2}
]
+Eς1,x,1
[(
−
∫ (δ−ς2)−
0
e−ρtdK∗t + e
−ρ(δ−ς2)g(Xδ−ς2)
)
1l{θ=δ−ς2}
]
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which is equal to the right side of (2.16) (up to ε) because the coefficients µ and σ are
time-independent. Therefore, we get
v1(ς2, x)− v1(ς1, x) ≤ ε, for any ε > 0,
which concludes the proof. 
Proposition 2.4. The value function v1 is continuous on S1, and v0 is continuous on S0.
Proof: v0 is obviously continuous on S0 because, from Proposition 2.3 and equation 2.12, it
satisfies the following inequalities:
−(y − x)/(1− κ0) + v0(y) ≤ v0(x) ≤ v0(y), for all x ≤ y ∈ S0.
We turn to the continuity of v1. Once again, by monotonicity (see Proposition 2.3) and
inequality (2.15), v1(ς, ·) is continuous, uniformly in ς. So we only need to prove that for
each x ∈ (0, D), v1(·, x) is continuous on [0, δ]. The right-continuity of v1(·, x) at ς = δ
follows from Proposition 2.2.
Let x ∈ [0, D] and 0 ≤ ς1 < ς2 < δ. Let ε > 0. From Proposition (2.3), we have v1(ς2, x)−
v1(ς1, x) ≤ 0. By the dynamic programming principle (Corollary 2.1), we know that there
exists K∗ such that, if we set θ = θD,+∧T for the pair (Ξ, X) started at Ξ0 = ς2 and X0 = x,
then we have
v1(ς1, x) ≤ E
[(∫ θ
0
−e−ρtdK∗t + e−ρθ
D,+
v0(D)
)
1l{θ<δ−ς2}
]
+E
[(∫ (δ−ς2)−
0
−e−ρtdK∗t + e−ρ(δ−ς2)v1(δ − (ς2 − ς1), Xδ−ς2)
)
1l{θ=δ−ς2}
]
+ ε
From the dynamic programming principle again, we have
v1(ς2, x) ≥ E
[(∫ θ
0
−e−ρtdK∗t + e−ρθ
D,+
v0(D)
)
1l{θ<δ−ς2}
]
+E
[(∫ δ−
0
e−ρtdK∗t + e
−ρ(δ−ς2)g(Xδ−ς2)
)
1l{θ=δ−ς2}
]
Therefore, we get
v1(ς2, x)− v1(ς1, x) ≥ E
[
e−ρ(δ−ς2) (g(Xδ−ς2)− v1(δ − (ς2 − ς1), Xδ−ς2)) 1l{θ=δ−ς2}
]
.
As in the proof of Proposition 2.2, we can prove that for ς1 going to ς2, supx∈[0,D] |g(x) −
v1(δ − (ς2 − ς1), x)| → 0, so that |v1(ς2, x)− v1(ς1, x)| converges to 0 as |ς2 − ς1| → 0. 
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3 Viscosity solution of variational inequalities
3.1 Variational inequalities
In the next section, the value functions vi are shown to satisfy, in the viscosity sense,
the following system of variational inequalities, associated to the Dynamic Programming
Principle presented in the previous section.
0 = min
(
ρv0 − Lv0 − J (v0, v1), 1l[0,D) + 1l[D,+∞)
[
v′0 −
1
1 + κ′
]
,
1
1− κ0
− v′0
)
on S̊0, (3.17)
0 = min
(
ρv1 − Lv1 − ∂v1∂ς ,
1
1−κ1 −
∂v1
∂x
)
on S̊1, (3.18)
0 = min
(
v1,
1
1−κ1 −
∂v1
∂x
)
on [0, δ)× {0}, (3.19)
0 = min
(
v0(0),
1
1−κ0 − v
′
0(0)
)
(3.20)
where S̊ i is the interior of S i and we have set
Lv = µ(x)∂v
∂x
+
1
2
σ2(x)
∂2v
∂x2
and J (v, w) = λ1l[0,D]
[
w(·, 0)− v
]
.
Recall that we have set
g(x) = max(v0(D)− (D − x)/(1− κ1), 0) on [0, D].
The value functions vi satisfy the following boundary conditions:
v1(ς,D) = v0(D) for ς ∈ (0, δ], (3.21)
v1(δ, x) = g(x) for x ∈ [0, D]. (3.22)
3.2 Viscosity property and comparison theorem
We start with proving that (v0, v1) is a viscosity solution to the previous system of variational
inequalities.
Proposition 3.5. The value function v := (v0, v1) is a viscosity solution of (3.17)-(3.22).
Proof: The proof of Proposition 3.5 is postponed in the Appendix.
We now turn the uniqueness property.
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Theorem 3.1 (Comparison Theorem). Let ui (i = 0, 1) be a nonnegative viscosity subsolu-
tion of 3.17-3.20, satisfying 3.21-3.22, and wi (i = 0, 1) a nonnegative viscosity supersolution
of 3.17-3.20, satisfying 3.21-3.22. Then, ui ≤ wi (i = 0, 1) on S.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 3.1 is postponed in the Appendix.
4 Optimal strategies description
In this section, we describe the following regions of the state space:
K0 := {z ∈ S0 : v′0(z+) =
1
1− κ0
}
K1ς := {z ∈ [0, D] :
∂v1
∂x
(ς, z+) =
1
1− κ1
}, K1 =
⋃
ς∈[0,δ]
(
{ς} × K1ς
)
D := {z ∈ [D,+∞) : v′0(z−) =
1
1 + κ′
}
C1 := S1 \ K1
C0 :=
(
K0 ∪ D
)c
for all ς ∈ [0, δ]. The set Ki represents the region where it is optimal to inject capital in
S i, and D is the region where it is optimal to payout dividends in S0. The set Ci is the
continuation region, where it is neither optimal to inject capital nor payout dividends.
In this section, we turn to the complete resolution of our problem, i.e. obtaining a complete
description of the continuation, dividend and capital injection regions enabling us to fully
describe the optimal policies. To do so, we shall consider the case in which µ and σ are
constant. This complete qualitative description of different regions may only be obtained
by introducing an optimal stopping time on a related reflected diffusion process. Solving
this optimal stopping-time problem allows us to characterize the optimal issuance of capital
policy during the grace period.
4.1 Optimal strategies during default
We first recall that as part of the debt covenants, the firm is not allowed to pay out dividends
when its debt-to-assets ratio is greater than one, which is the case when the firm is declared
in default.
We now begin by recalling the function g and introducing the following function h defined
on R+:
g(x) =
(
v0(D)−
1
1− κ1
(D − x)
)+
and h(x) :=
1
1− κ1
(
x+
µ
ρ
)
.
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We also define the following threshold:
x∗1 := (1− κ1)(h(D)− g(D)) = D +
µ
ρ
− (1− κ1)v0(D). (4.23)
Proposition 4.6. Assume that x∗1 ≤ 0 then we have v1(ς, x) = g(x) on S1 and K1 = S1.
Proof: The pair v1 = g and v0 is a viscosity solution of (3.18)-(3.22). 
Throughout the rest of this section we shall therefore assume that
x∗1 > 0 i.e. v0(D) < h(D) =
1
1− κ1
(
D +
µ
ρ
)
. (4.24)
In this case, h is an upper bound for v1:
Lemma 4.1. For all (ς, x) ∈ S1, we have v1(ς, x) ≤ h(x).
Proof: It is easy to check that the function h is a supersolution of (3.18)-(3.19) with (3.21)-
(3.22). 
Lemma 4.2. For all ς ∈ [0, δ], we define x∗1(ς) as the smallest solution of the equation
v1(ς, x) = g(x) =
(
v0(D)−
D − x
1− κ1
)+
on [0, D]. (4.25)
We have the following results:
i) We have (x∗1(ς), D] ⊂ K1ς and
x∗1(ς) = sup{x ∈ [0, D) :
∂v1
∂x
(ς, x+) <
1
1− κ1
}.
ii) For all ς ∈ [0, δ), x∗1(ς) ≥ min(x∗1, D).
iii) The function ς → x∗1(ς) is non increasing on [0, δ].
Remark 4.2. Lemma 4.2, points i) and ii) clearly state that when in default, at any given
time ς before δ, there exists a threshold x∗1(ς) for the assets value above which, it is optimal
to inject capital to move the firm’s assets value up to D and get out of default.
In Point iii), the threshold x∗1(ς) is proved to be non increasing in ς. Economically, it means
that the more time the firm has before the end of the grace period, the more patient it should
be. In other words, when it is still far from the end of the grace period δ, it is optimal to
wait until the firm’s assets value is close enough to D before injecting more capital to get
out of default.
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Proof: As, v1(ς,D) = v0(D), there is in fact a smallest solution x
∗
1(ς) to (4.25).
We first prove assertion i). As the function z → v1(ς, z) is increasing, for any y ∈ [x∗1(ς), D]
we have
g(y) ≤ v1(ς, y) = v1(ς, x∗1(ς)) +
∫ y
x∗1(ς)
∂v1
∂x
(ς, z) dz ≤ v1(ς, x∗1(ς)) +
y − x∗1(ς)
1− κ1
= g(y).
Hence, v1(ς, y) = g(y) on [x
∗
1(ς), D] and that proves assertion i).
Recall that x∗1 > 0. By contradiction, assume that there exists ς ∈ [0, δ), such that
x∗1(ς) < y
∗
1
:= min(x∗1, D).
We notice that
v1(ς, y
∗
1
) ≥ v0(D)−
D − y∗
1
1− κ1
≥ min(v0(D),
µ
ρ(1− κ1)
) > 0.
Therefore, we deduce from the monotonicity of v1 with respect to ς that there exists η > 0
such that
v1(ς, x) = g(x) > 0 on (ς, ς + η)× (y∗1 − η, y
∗
1
).
The above leads to a contradiction as, on (ς, ς + η)× (y∗
1
− η, y∗
1
), we obtain
0 ≤ −Lv1 −
∂v1
∂ς
=
ρ
1− κ1
(x− x∗1) < 0.
Consequently, we have shown that x∗1(ς) ≥ y∗1 = min(x
∗
1, D).
Finally we prove that the function ς → x∗1(ς) is non increasing on [0, δ]. Let 0 ≤ ς0 < ς1 < δ
and define the following function on S1
V (ς, x) :=
{
v1(ς, x) if ς ≤ ς0 or x ≤ x∗1(ς0)
v0(D)− 11−κ1 (D − x) if ς > ς0 and x > x
∗
1(ς0)
(4.26)
We can check that V is a continuous solution of equations (3.18)-(3.22) on S̊1 so V = v1
and x∗1(ς0) ≤ x∗1(ς1). 
Remark 4.3. On one hand, we have shown that, for any ς ∈ [0, δ),
x∗1(ς) ≥ min (x∗1, D) .
On the other hand, it is easy to check that
x∗1(δ) = (D − (1− κ1)v0(D))
+ < x∗1
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Hence we may have a jump in the optimal threshold ς → x∗1(ς) at time δ.
Remark 4.4. If D < x∗1 then x
∗
1(ς) = D for any ς ∈ [0, δ).
The following lemma is a direct consequence of the monotonicity of v(·, 0):
Lemma 4.3. There exists a threshold ς∗ ∈ [0, δ] such that
v1(ς, 0) > 0 for 0 ≤ ς < ς∗ and v1(ς, 0) = 0 for ς∗ ≤ ς < δ.
In order to give a complete description of K1, we will prove that the value function v1
corresponds to an optimal stopping problem.
Due to the previous lemma, we can define the following auxiliary optimal stopping problem.
For (ς, x) ∈ [0, δ)× [0, D], we first introduce a pair of processes (X∗, K∗) with the following
dynamic:
dX∗t := µdt+ σdWt + dK
∗
t , X
∗
0− = x, K
∗
0− = 0. (4.27)
where X∗t ≥ 0 for t ∈ [ς, ς∗] and K∗ is a non-decreasing process which satisfies∫ t
0
1l{X∗s=0}dK
∗
s = K
∗
t , for all 0 ≤ t ≤ (ς∗ − ς)+, and dK∗t = 0, for (ς∗ − ς)+ ≤ t ≤ δ − ς.
(4.28)
We now define the following optimal stopping problem:
w(ς, x) := sup
ν∈T0,δ−ς
E
[
e−ρν∧θg(X∗ν∧θ)−
1
1− κ1
∫ ν∧θ∧(ς∗−ς)+
0
e−ρsdK∗s
]
, (4.29)
where we have set θ := θ∗,D,+ ∧ θ∗,0,− with
θ∗,D,+ := inf{s ≥ 0 : X∗s ≥ D} and θ∗,0,− := inf{s ≥ ς∗ : X∗s ≤ 0}.
We now give the following theorem which allows to fully describe the capital issuance
region K1 when the firm is in default. The corresponding continuation region C1 may equally
be obtained.
Theorem 4.2. We have v1 = w and
K1 := [0, ς∗)× {0} ∪ {(ς, x) ∈ S1 : x ≥ x∗1(ς)} (4.30)
Remark 4.5. Theorem 4.2 states that the capital issuance region includes two disconnected
domains.
• The first domain which corresponds to K11 := {(ς, x) ∈ S1 : x ≥ x∗1(ς)} is as described
in Lemma 4.2 and Remark 4.2. When in that domain, it is optimal for the firm to
increase the capital by D − x∗1(ς), net of issuance cost.
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• The second domain is defined by K12 := [0, ς∗) × {0}. While in default and the firm’s
asset value goes to zero, if there is enough time, i.e. ς < ς∗, it is still optimal to
inject capital to keep the firm afloat, i.e. to keep the firm’s assets value just above zero
and avoid bankruptcy. The assets value process may evolve favorably and reach K11.
However, at ς ≥ ς∗, there is not enough to reach K11, it is therefore optimal to let the
firm go bankrupt.
Proof: We first prove that w ≤ v1. Let (ς, x) ∈ S̊1. We define the following process
Kt = K
∗
t∧τ∗ + (D − x∗1(ς + τ ∗))1l{t≥τ∗},
where we have set
τ ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : X∗t ≥ x∗1(ς + t)}.
We can check that K ∈ A0 and therefore, the dynamic programming principle leads to:
v1(ς, x) ≥ Eς,x,1
[
e−ρT∧θ
D,+
v1(T ∧ θD,+, X∗T∧θD,+)−
∫ T∧θD,+
0
e−ρsdKs
]
= w(ς, x).
In a second step, we prove that w ≥ v1. By construction, it is easy to see that w satisfies
(3.21)-(3.22). To prove w ≥ v1, we can therefore show that w is a supersolution of the HJB
equation (3.18)-(3.19). We first prove that
∂w
∂x
≤ 1
1− κ1
in the viscosity sense. Let (ς, x) ∈ [0, δ) × [0, D) and h > 0 such that x + h ≤ D. Let
ψ ∈ C1,2(S̊1) such that ψ1 ≤ w and ψ1(ς, x) = w(ς, x). We define the pair of processes
(X∗,h, K∗,h) with the following dynamic:
dX∗,ht := µdt+ σdWt + 1l{t≤ς∗}dK
∗,h
t , X
∗,h
0− = x+ h, K
∗,h
0− = 0.
where X∗,h ≥ 0 and K∗,h is a non-decreasing process which satisfies∫ t
0
1l{X∗,hs =0}dK
∗,h
s = K
∗,h
t , for all 0 ≤ t ≤ δ. (4.31)
From the uniqueness of solutions of the stochastic equation (4.31), we have X∗,h ≥ X∗. Let
θh := θ∗,D,+h ∧ θ
∗,0,−
h with
θ∗,D,+h := inf{s ≥ 0 : X
∗,h
s ≥ D} and θ
∗,0,−
h := inf{s ≥ ς
∗ : X∗,hs ≤ 0}.
If we set θ0,−h := inf{t ≥ 0 : x+ h+ µt+ σWt = 0}, we have
K∗,ht∧(ς∗−ς)+ = K
∗
t∧(ς∗−ς)+ −K∗t∧θ0,−h ∧(ς∗−ς)+
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for t ≤ δ − ς, and
X∗,ht −X∗t = h−K∗t∧θ0,−h ∧(ς∗−ς)+
for t ≤ θ∗,0,−.
Let ε > 0. There exists νh ∈ T0,δ−ς such that:
w(ς, x+ h) ≤ E
[
e−ρθ
∗,0,−
w(X∗,hθ∗,0,−)1l{νh∧θh>θ∗,0,−} + e
−ρνh∧θhg(X∗,h
νh∧θh)1l{νh∧θh≤θ∗,0,−}
− 1
1− κ1
∫ νh∧θh∧θ∗,0,−∧(ς∗−ς)+
0
e−ρsdK∗,hs
]
+ ε.
Moreover, it follows from the definition of w, that
w(ς, x) ≥ E
[
e−ρν
h∧θhg(X∗νh∧θh)1l{νh∧θh≤θ∗,0,−} −
1
1− κ1
∫ νh∧θh∧θ∗,0,−∧(ς∗−ς)+
0
e−ρsdK∗s
]
.
Therefore, we get
w(ς, x+ h)− w(ς, x) ≤ E
[
e−ρθ
∗,0,−
v1(θ
∗,0,−, X∗,hθ∗,0,−)1l{νh∧θh≥θ∗,0,−}
+e−ρν
h∧θh
(
g(X∗,h
νh∧θh)− g(X
∗
νh∧θh)
)
1l{νh∧θh≤θ∗,0,−}
]
+
1
1− κ1
E
[ ∫ νh∧θh∧θ∗,0,−∧(ς∗−ς)+
0
e−ρsdK∗s
]
+ ε, (4.32)
since v1 ≥ w. As, for all (y, y′) ∈ [0, D]2, g(y)− g(y′) ≤ (y − y′)/(1− κ1), we get
E
[
e−ρν
h∧θh(g(X∗,h
νh∧θh) − g(X
∗
νh∧θh))1l{νh∧θh≤θ∗,0,−}
]
≤ 1
1− κ1
E
[
e−ρν
h∧θh
(
X∗,h
νh∧θh −X
∗
νh∧θh
)
1l{νh∧θh≤θ∗,0,−}
]
≤ 1
1− κ1
E
[
(h−K∗τh) 1l{νh∧θh≤θ∗,0,−}
]
.
where we have set τh := νh ∧ θh ∧ θ∗,0,− ∧ θ0,−h ∧ (ς∗− ς)+. Furthermore, from (2.15), we find
E
[
e−ρθ
∗,0,−
v1(θ
∗,0,−, X∗,hθ∗,0,−)1l{νh∧θh≥θ∗,0,−}
]
≤ E
[h−Kτh
1− κ1
1l{νh∧θh≥θ∗,0,−}
]
(4.33)
Plugging this in inequality (4.32), using the fact that ψ ≤ w and letting ε go to 0, we obtain
:
ψ(ς, x+ h)− ψ(ς, x) ≤ 1
1− κ1
E
[
h−K∗τh +
∫ τh
0
e−ρsdK∗s
]
+ ε
≤ h
1− κ1
. (4.34)
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In particular,
min
(
w,
1
1− κ1
− ∂ψ
∂x
)
≥ 0 on [0, δ)× {0}
since w ≥ 0.
Now, we turn to the proof of w being a supersolution of (3.18). Let (ς, x) ∈ S̊1 and
ψ ∈ C1,2(S̊1) such that ψ ≤ w and ψ(ς, x) = w(ς, x). We already know that
∂ψ
∂x
(ς, x) ≤ 1
1− κ1
.
Assume that there exists η > 0 such that
ρψ(ς, x)− Lψ(ς, x) < −η. (4.35)
Since ψ ∈ C1,2(S̊1), we can assume that there exists ε > 0 (ε < min(x,D− x, ς, δ − ς)) such
that the above inequality is also satisfied for all (s, z) such that |z − x|2 + |s − ς| < ε. Let
θ = inf{t ≥ 0 : |X∗t − x|2 + |t− ς| ≥ ε}.
By Itô’s Formula,
ψ(ς, x) = Eς,x,1
[
e−ρθψ(ς + θ,X∗θ ) +
∫ θ
0
e−ρt(ρψ(ς + t,X∗t )− Lψ(ς + t,X∗t ))dt
−
∫ θ
0
e−ρtψ′(ς + t,X∗t )dK
∗
t
]
< Eς,x,1
[
e−ρθψ(ς + θ,X∗θ )−
η
ρ
(1− e−ρθ)
]
.
≤ Eς,x,1
[
e−ρθw(ς + θ,X∗θ )−
η
ρ
(1− e−ρθ)
]
From the DPP, we have
ψ(ς, x) = w(ς, x) ≥ Eς,x,1
[
e−ρθw(ς + θ,X∗θ )−
1
1− κ1
∫ θ
0
e−ρt dK∗t
]
.
= Eς,x,1
[
e−ρθw(ς + θ,X∗θ )
]
.
It leads to a contradiction since Ee−ρθ < 1. Therefore w is a supersolution of the HJB
equation (3.18)-(3.19), (3.21)-(3.22), and from the comparison Theorem (3.1) we know that
w ≥ v1. 
4.2 Optimal strategies before default
We first turn to the complete description of the dividend region, which is a given interval
D = [xd0,+∞).
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Lemma 4.4. Dividend region
There exists a threshold xd0 ≥ D such that D = [xd0,+∞). If v0(D) ≥
µ
(1+κ′)ρ
then xd0 = D
else xd0 is the unique solution in (D,+∞) of the following equation:
ρv0(x
d
0) =
µ
1 + κ′
.
Moreover, on (D,+∞), v0 is twice continuously differentiable.
Proof: First we assume that v0(D) <
µ
(1+κ′)ρ
. As v0 is continuous and increasing on [0,+∞),
there exists xd0 > D such that
ρv0(x
d
0) =
µ
1 + κ′
Now we define the following function
V (t, x) :=
{
v0(x) if x ≤ xd0
1
1+κ′
(x− xd0) + v0(xd0) if x > xd0
(4.36)
We can easily prove that V is a viscosity solution of equations (3.17) and (3.20) then V = v0.
If v0(D) ≥ µ(1+κ′)ρ , we can show in the same way that v0(x) = v0(D) +
1
1+κ′
(x − D) for all
x ≥ D. Hence, D = [D,+∞).
We turn to the proof of concavity on (D,+∞) for the function v0. From equation (3.17),
we deduce that on (D, xd0):
1
2
σ2v′′0 ≤ ρv0 − µv′0
≤ ρv0 − µ
1
1 + κ′
≤ 0.
As v0 is linear on [x
d
0,+∞), v0 is concave on (D,+∞). 
Lemma 4.5. Capital issuance out of financial distress region
We have K0 ∩ (D,+∞) = ∅
Remark 4.6. The above Lemma 4.5 states that when the firm’s assets value is strictly
greater than D, it is not optimal to inject additional capital, which is coherent with the
results obtained by Lokka and Zervos [16] in the case when D = 0.
Proof: Assume, by contradiction, that K0 ∩ (D,+∞) 6= ∅. From the concavity of v0 on
(D,+∞), we deduce that there exists x0 > D such that (D, x0) ⊂ K0 ∩ (D,+∞). We then
have
v0(D) = v0(x)−
1
1− κ0
(x−D) on (D, x0).
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From equation (3.17), it follows that
0 ≤ ρv0(D) +
1
1− κ0
(ρ(x−D)− µ)
Moreover, it follows from Proposition 4.4 that v0(D) <
µ
(1+κ′)ρ
else we should have v′0(x) =
1
1+κ′
on (D,+∞). Hence we obtain
0 ≤ − µ(κ
′ + κ0)
(1 + κ′)(1− κ0)
+
ρ
1− κ0
(x−D).
It leads to a contradiction when letting x go to D.

We now turn to the description of the capital issuance region K0. We will separate several
cases depending on the value of x∗1.
Proposition 4.7. We consider the case x∗1 ≤ 0. then we have
K̊0 = (0, D) and v0(x) = g0(x) :=
(
v0(D)−
D − x
1− κ0
)+
, for x ∈ [0, D]. (4.37)
Remark 4.7. In Proposition 4.6, when x∗1 ≤ 0, we have K1 = S1, i.e. K1ς = (0, D)
∀ς ∈ [0, δ]. The above Proposition 4.7 states that when the firm’s value is below D but still
not in default, the optimal strategy is to straightaway inject capital and not take the risk of
being declared in default given the higher issuance cost when in default.
Proof: From Proposition 4.6, we know that if v0(D) ≥ h(D) then v1(t, x) = g(x) on S1.
It follows that the function g0 is solution of the HJB equation (3.17) and (3.20). From the
comparison Theorem 3.1, we deduce that v0 = g0 on [0, D] 
Proposition 4.8. We consider the case x∗1 > 0. We define x
∗
0 as the smallest solution of
the equation
v0(x) = g0(x) :=
(
v0(D)−
D − x
1− κ0
)+
on (0, D]. (4.38)
We then have [x∗0, D) ⊂ K0 and x∗0 = sup{x ∈ [0, D] : v′0(x) < 11−κ0}.
Furthermore, if x∗1 > D +
µ
ρ
(
κ1−κ0
1−κ0
)
, then we have x∗0 = D.
Proof:
We assume x∗1 > 0. Notice that we should have g0(x
∗
0) = v0(x
∗
0) > 0. For any y ∈ [x∗0, D] we
then have
g0(y) ≤ v0(y) ≤ v0(x∗0) +
y − x∗0
1− κ0
= v0(D)−
D − y
1− κ0
≤ g0(y).
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Hence, v0(y) = v0(D)− D−y1−κ0 on [x
∗
0, D] and that proves the result.
We now assume x∗1 > D +
µ
ρ
(
κ1−κ0
1−κ0
)
, i.e. ρv0(D) <
µ
1−κ0 .
We can easily show that x∗0 = D. Indeed, if there was an ε > 0 such that (D − ε,D) ⊂ K0,
we would have v0(x) = g0(x) and H(x) := ρv0(x) − Lv0(x) − J (v0(x), v1(0, x)) ≥ 0 on
(D− ε,D). However it would lead to a contradiction because H(D) = ρv0(D) < − µ1−κ0 < 0
and H is continuous.

5 Numerical results
5.1 Numerical procedure
There are two main difficulties in numerically solving the system of variational inequalities
by finite difference methods. The first is due to the boundary conditions in S1. However, if
v(D) is known, we can use Theorem 4.2 to solve this part of the domain as a stopping time
problem with a reflected process at 0. The second difficulty is the coupling between regions
S0 and S1 through the value v(D). Consequently, the numerical procedure we propose
consists in a fixed point problem around v(D). Given v(D), each parts of the domain can be
solved independently. It then remains to check if the variational inequality is also satisfied
in x = D.
The procedure is as follows.
First step: For a > 0, let va1 be the solution of the following variational inequality on S1:
min
(
ρv − Lv − ∂v
∂ς
, ga − v
)
= 0 on S̊1, (5.39)
min
(
v,
1
1− κ1
− ∂v
∂x
)
= 0 on [0, δ)× {0}, (5.40)
v(δ, x) = ga(x) for x ∈ [0, D], (5.41)
where ga(x) := (a − D−x
1−κ1 )
+. To solve this system numerically, we can use explicit finite
differences to solve the system by comparing at each point in time ς the solutions with the
boundary conditions va1(ς, 0) = 0 and
∂va1
∂x
(ς, 0) = 1
1−κ1 , and keep the largest solution of the
two at each point in time.
Notice that we have
For any b ≥ a, va1 ≤ vb1, on S1.
Indeed, for b ≥ a, it is easy to show that vb1 is a supersolution of the previous HJB equation
and so, greater than the solution va1 .
It follows from the Lipschitz property that:
For any b ≥ a, 0 ≤ vb1 − va1 ≤ b− a, on S1. (5.42)
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Second step: Compute the solution of the following variational inequality on [0, D):
min
(
ρv − Lv − J (v, va1),
1
1− κ0
− v′
)
= 0 on (0, D), (5.43)
min
(
v(0),
1
1− κ0
− v′(0)
)
= 0, (5.44)
v(D) = a. (5.45)
As before, this can be solved numerically by considering the boundary condition v(0) = 0
and v′(0) = 1
1−κ0 , and select the largest of the two. We denote by v
a
0 the solution on [0, D).
Once again we have
For any b ≥ a, va0 ≤ vb0, on [0, D].
Indeed, for b ≥ a, it is easy to show that vb0 is a supersolution of the previous HJB equation
and so, greater than the solution va0 .
Now we can use the property (5.42) to prove that, for b ≥ a, va0 + b− a is a supersolution of
the HJB equation satisfied by vb0. We obtain that
For any b ≥ a, 0 ≤ vb0 − va0 ≤ b− a, on [0, D). (5.46)
Third step: Compute the solution of the following variational inequality on (D,∞):
min
(
ρv − Lv, v′ − 1
1 + κ′
,
1
1− κ0
− v′
)
= 0 on (D,∞), (5.47)
v(D) = a. (5.48)
We denote by va0 the solution on (D,∞). Once again we have
For any b ≥ a, va0 ≤ vb0, on S0.
Indeed, for b ≥ a, it is easy to show that vb0 is a supersolution of the previous HJB equation
and so, greater than the solution va0 .
Now we can use the property (5.42) to prove that, for b ≥ a, va0 + b− a is a supersolution of
the HJB equation satisfied by vb0. We therefore obtain that
For any b ≥ a, 0 ≤ vb0 − va0 ≤ b− a, on S0. (5.49)
Fourth step: Find the unique value of a that solves the equation va0(D) = a. We have just
proved that a → va0(D) − a is a Lipschitz and nonincreasing function. We obviously have
v00(D) ≥ 0. Now we want to determine lima→∞ va0(D) − a. Let a ≥ max
(
µ
κ′ρ
; D
)
and, on
S0, define the function ψa by
ψa(x) :=
a
µ+ ρa
(ρx+ µ) .
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With a large enough, we can check that ρa
µ+ρa
∈ [ 1
1+κ′
, 1
1−κ0 ]. It follows that ψ
a is a superso-
lution of HJB equations (5.39)-(5.48) and then
va1(ς, x) ≤ ψa(x), on S1 and va0(x) ≤ ψa(x), on S0.
Hence, we get
va0(D)− a ≤ −
ρa
µ+ ρa
(a−D) ≤ 0. (5.50)
We can conclude that there exist solutions to the equation va0(D) = a and that they belong
to [0, max
(
µ
κ′ρ
; D
)
]. According to the comparison result (see Theorem 3.1), there exists a
unique solution that can be found by dichotomy methods.
5.2 Numerical illustrations
We present in this section a number of numerical examples that illustrate the above theo-
retical results. Figure 1 gives an example of a region S1 in which there is no reflection at
x = 0 in S1, but the optimal capital injection happens before x = D. The effect of κ1 on
the capital region is illustrated in Figure 2 in which we see that larger values of κ1 make the
region smaller and more to the right.
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Figure 1: Optimal strategy in S1. Parameters are D = 2, δ = 0.5, κ0 = κ1 = κ′ = 0.1, λ =
5, µ = 0.05, ρ = 0.1 and σ = 1. The black area represents the region where it is optimal to
inject capital in S1, i.e. v1 = g.
On the other hand, Figure 3 shows the case where it is only optimal to reflect the process X
on the boundary x = 0 and ς ∈ [0, ς∗], as defined in Lemma 4.3. For this particular choice
of parameters, it is not optimal to inject capital for other values in S1. We notice that for
values of κ1 = 0.07 or less, the reflection of the process X is for all ς ∈ [0, δ].
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Figure 2: Boundaries of the optimal strategy in S1. Parameters are D = 2, δ = 0.5, κ0 =
κ′ = 0.1, λ = 5, µ = 0.05, ρ = 0.1 and σ = 1. The values of the parameter κ1 varies from
0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2 to 0.25, from left to right in the figure.
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Figure 3: Value of ∂v1(ς,0)
∂x
for various values of κ1. Parameters are D = 0.2, δ = 0.3, κ0 =
0.1, κ′ = 0.01, λ = 5, µ = 0.05, ρ = 0.1 and σ = 1. The values of the parameter κ1 varies
from 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.1 to 0.11, from bottom to top in the figure. Circles show the value ς∗
of Lemma 4.3. The largest value of the derivative is 1
1−κ1 for ς ∈ [0, ς
∗].
Figure 4 shows how the value function v0 depends on the debt level D. The value function
at the point xd0 starting at which it is optimal to issue dividends is shown to equal
µ
ρ(1+κ′)
,
which is independent of D (see Proposition 4.4).
Figures 5 and 6 show the derivative of the function v0 on S0 for varying values of D. For
D = 0.1, 0.2 or 0.3, (Fig. 5) it is optimal to inject capital only at x = 0. It is never optimal
to inject capital for the other values of D considered (Fig. 6). Furthermore, note that the
derivative of the function goes below the value 1
1+κ′
= 0.909 for some values of x less than
D, for D = 0.6, 0.8, 1 and 1.5. This is only possible because it is not permitted to distribute
dividends for those values of x < D. In other words, the constraint v′0(x) ≥ 11+κ′ does not
apply.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis of the value function v0(x) in terms of D, taking values in
{0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.5} (from left to right in the graph). Other parameters are
fixed to δ = 0.3, κ0 = κ1 = 0.25, κ
′ = 0.1, λ = 1, µ = 0.07, ρ = 0.1 and σ = 0.3. Blue squares
represent the value function at x = D. Dashed line is at level µ
ρ(1+κ′)
, the value at which it
is optimal to pay dividends, independent of the value of D.
Figures 5 and 6 correspond to sensitivity analysis of the derivative of the value function v0 in
terms of D. Other parameters are fixed to δ = 0.3, κ0 = κ1 = 0.25, κ
′ = 0.1, λ = 1, µ = 0.07,
ρ = 0.1 and σ = 0.3. Dashed lines are at levels 1
1−κ0 = 1.3333 and
1
1+κ′
= 0.909. Blue
squares represent the value of the derivative at x = D.
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Figure 5: D takes values in {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} from left to right.
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Figure 6: D takes values in {0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.5} from left to right.
Appendix A : Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof: Equations 3.21 and 3.22 have been proved to be satisfied in Proposition 2.2.
The proof of the supersolution property is classical, so we omit it and focus on the subsolution
property.
Let (ς, x, y) ∈ S̊1 × S̊0. Let ψ0 ∈ C2(S̊0) and ψ1 ∈ C1,2(S̊1) such that ψ1(ς, x) = v1(ς, x),
ψ0(y) = v0(y) and ψi ≥ vi, i = 0, 1. We have to prove that (ψ0, ψ1) satisfies (3.17)-(3.20)
with = replaced by ≥ . Suppose that it is not true:
Case (1) Assume that the inequality coming from (3.17) is not true for some x > 0.
There exist η > 0 and 0 < ε < min(x, 1) such that for all y satisfying |x− y| < ε,
ρψ0(y)− Lψ0(y)− λ(v1(0, y)− ψ0(y)) > η and (1− κ0)ψ′0(y) < 1− η if y < D,
ρψ0(y)− Lψ0(y) > η, (1 + κ′)ψ′0(y) > 1 + η and (1− κ0)ψ′0(y) < 1− η otherwise.
Consider ε1 = x + ε and ε2 = x − ε (as positive constants), and set θ = inf{s ≥ t :
|Xxs − x| > ε}. Let ξ = inf{s ≥ 0 : Is = 1}, and notice that |Xθ − x| = ε on {θ < ξ}, for any
(Z,K) ∈ A. Recall that dZt = 0 on {Xt < D}. Consequently, (1+κ′)ψ′0(Xt)dZt ≥ (1+η)dZt,
for all t ≥ 0. We can therefore show that
Ex,0
[∫ θ∧ξ
0
e−ρt(dZt − dKt) + e−ρθv0(Xθ)1{θ<ξ} + e−ρξv1(0, Xθ)1{ξ≤θ}
]
≤ Ex,0
[∫ θ∧ξ
0
e−ρt(dZt − dKt) + e−ρ(θ∧ξ)ψ0(Xθ∧ξ) +
∫ θ∧ξ
0
λe−ρt(ψ0(Xt)− v1(0, Xt))1{Xt<D}dt
]
≤ ψ0(x)− ηEx,0
[∫ θ∧ξ
0
e−ρtdt+
∫ θ∧ξ
0
e−ρt(dZt + dKt)
]
. (5.51)
By considering ϕ(y) = C((y−x)2−ε2), for some positive constant C < min( 1
2ε
, 1
(ρ+λ)ε2+2µ̄ε+σ̄2
),
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we find that
Cε2 = Ex,0
[
e−ρθϕ(Xθ)1{θ≤ξ} − ϕ(x)
]
= Ex,0
[ ∫ θ∧ξ
0
e−ρt
(
−(ρ+ λ1{Xt<D})ϕ(Xt) + 2Cµ(Xt)(Xt − x) + Cσ2(Xt)
)
dt
+
∫ θ∧ξ
0
e−ρt2C(Xt − x) ((1− κ0)dKt − (1 + κ′)dZt)
]
≤ Ex,0
[∫ θ∧ξ
0
e−ρtdt+
∫ θ∧ξ
0
e−ρt(dZt + dKt)
]
.
By taking a supremum over (Z,K) ∈ A in (5.51) and applying the dynamic programming
principle (2.12), we find the contradiction:
v0(x) ≤ ψ0(x)− ηCε2 < ψ0(x) = v0(x).
Case (2): Assume that inequality associated to (3.18) is not satisfied.
There exists η > 0 such that
ρψ1(ς, x)− Lψ1(ς, x) > η, and (1− κ1)
∂ψ1
∂x
(ς, x) < 1− η. (5.52)
Since ψ1 ∈ C1,2(S̊1), we can assume that there exists ε > 0 (ε < min(x,D−x, ς, δ− ς)) such
that the above inequality is also satisfied for all (s, z) such that |x− z|2 + |s− ς| ≤ ε.
Consider ε1(s) = x+
√
ε− (s− ς) and ε2(s) = x−
√
ε− (s− ς), for s < ς+ε, ε1(s) = ε2(s) =
x otherwise. Let (Z,K) ∈ A. Then, if we set θ := inf{t ≥ 0 : |Xxt −x|2 +Ξt−ς > ε}, we have
|Xθ − x|2 = ε− θ, by definition of A. Furthermore, θ < T ∧ θD,+ and |Xt − x|2 + Ξt − ς ≤ ε
for all t ≤ θ.
By Itô’s Formula,
ψ1(ς, x) = Eς,x,1
[
e−ρθψ1(Ξθ, Xθ) +
∫ θ
0
e−ρt(ρψ1(Ξt, Xt)− Lψ1(Ξt, Xt))dt
−
∫ θ
0
e−ρt(1− κ1)
∂ψ1
∂x
(Ξt, Xt)dK
c
t
−
∑
0≤t≤θ
e−ρt (ψ1(Ξt, Xt− + (1− κ1)∆Kt)− ψ1(Ξt, Xt−))
]
.
Due to (5.52), (1− κ1)∂ψ1∂x (Ξt, Xt) < 1− η and ψ1(Ξt, Xt− + (1− κ1)∆Kt)− ψ1(Ξt, Xt−) <
(1− η)∆Kt. Consequently,
ψ1(ς, x) ≥ Eς,x,1
[
−
∫ θ
0
e−ρtdKt + e
−ρθψ1(Ξθ, Xθ)
]
+Eς,x,1
[ ∫ θ
0
e−ρt(ρψ1(Ξt, Xt)− Lψ1(Ξt, Xt))dt+ η
∫ θ
0
e−ρtdKt
]
.
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Combining the previous inequality with the fact that ψ1 ≥ v1 and (5.52), we get
v1(ς, x) ≥ Eς,x,1
[
−
∫ θ
0
e−ρtdKt + e
−ρθv1(Ξθ, Xθ) + η
∫ θ
0
e−ρt (dt+ dKt)
]
. (5.53)
Let ϕ(s, z) = C((z−x)2−ε+(s−ς)), for some positive constant C < min( 1
2
√
ε
, 1
ρε+2µ̄
√
ε+σ̄2+1
)
in which
µ̄ = sup
x∈[0,D]
µ(x), σ̄ = sup
x∈[0,D]
σ(x).
By Itô’s formula,
Cε = Eς,x,1
[
e−ρθϕ(Ξθ, Xθ)− ϕ(ς, x)
]
≤ Eς,x,1
[∫ θ
0
e−ρt(−ρϕ(Ξt, Xt) + 2µ(Xt)C(Xt− − x) + Cσ2(Xt) + C)dt
]
+Eς,x,1
[
−
∫ θ
0
e−ρt2C(Xt− − x)(1− κ1)dKt
]
≤ Eς,x,1
[∫ θ
0
e−ρtdt+
∫ θ
0
e−ρtdKt
]
.
Taking a supremum over (Z,K) ∈ A in (5.53) and applying the dynamic programming
principle (2.13), we find the following contradiction:
v1(t, x) ≥ v1(t, x) + ηCε.
Case (3) Assume that inequality coming from (3.19) is not verified for some (ς, 0) ∈ [0, δ]×
{0} : there exists η and t > 0 such that for all ε > 0, 0 ≤ x ≤ ε, and ς ≤ s ≤ ς + t
v1(s, x) > η,
∂ψ1
∂x
(s, x) <
1
1− κ1
− η and ψ1(s, 0) < ψ1(ς, 0) + C(s− ς), (5.54)
due to the continuity of v1 and
∂ψ1
∂x
. Here C = supς≤s≤ς+t
∂ψ1(s,0)
∂s
. Assume further that
ε < min(D, v1(ς, 0)/η) and t < δ − ς.
We consider θ := inf{s ≥ 0 : Xs ≥ ε} and deduce from (5.54) and the dynamic program-
ming principle (2.13) that,
v1(ς, 0) = sup
(Z,K)∈A,Z≡0
Eς,0,1
[
− I1 + e−ρθv1(Ξθ, ε)1l{θ<T∧t} + e−ρtv1(Ξt, Xt)1{t≤θ∧T}
]
≤ sup
K∈A0
Eς,0,1
[
− I1 + e−ρθψ1(Ξθ, ε)1l{θ<T∧t} + A01{t≤θ∧T}
]
where A0 = sup0≤x≤ε v1(Ξt, x), a finite quantity, and I1 stands for
∫ θ∧T∧t
0
e−ρsdKs. We can
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therefore bound the value v1(ς, 0) above by
sup
K∈A0
Eς,0,1
[
− I1 + e−ρθ(ψ1(Ξθ, 0) + (
1
1− κ1
− η)ε)1l{θ<T∧t} + A01{t≤θ∧T}
]
≤ ψ1(ς, 0)− ηε+ sup
K∈A0
Eς,0,1
[
− I1 + e−ρθ(Cθ +
1
1− κ1
ε)1l{θ<T∧t} + A01{t≤θ∧T}
]
≤ v1(ς, 0)− ηε+ sup
K∈A0
Eς,0,1
[
− I1 + Cθ + e−ρθ
1
1− κ1
Xθ1l{θ<T∧t} + A01{t≤θ∧T}
]
≤ v1(ς, 0)− ηε+ sup
K∈A0
Eς,0,1
[
Cθ +
∫ θ∧T∧t
0
e−ρs
(
µ(Xs)− ρXs
1− κ1
)
ds+ A01{t≤θ∧T}
]
≤ v1(ς, 0)− ηε+ (C + C ′) sup
K∈A0
Eς,0,1[θ] + A0P(t ≤ θ)
≤ v1(ς, 0)− ηε+
ε2(C + C ′ + A0/t)
σ2
,
where C ′ = supx<D
(
µ(x)−ρx
1−κ1
)
<∞. We find a contradiction by taking ε strictly less than
ησ2
(C + C ′ + A0/t)
.
Case (4) Assume that the inequality coming from (3.20) is not verified : there exists η > 0
such that for all ε > 0
v0(x) > η and ψ
′
0(x) <
1
1− κ0
− η for all 0 ≤ x < ε, (5.55)
due to the continuity of v0 and ψ
′
0. Assume further that ε < min(D, v0(0)/η). As before,
consider θ := inf{s ≥ 0 : Xs ≥ ε}, ξ = inf{s ≥ 0 : Is = 1}, and notice that |Xθ − x| = ε
on {θ < ξ}, and Xt < D, for all t < θ. We also set I0 :=
∫ θ∧T∧ξ
0
e−ρtdKt and deduce from
(5.55) and the dynamic programming principle (2.13) that
v0(0) = sup
(Z,K)∈A,Z≡0
E0
[
− I0 + e−ρθv0(ε)1l{θ<T∧ξ} + e−ρξv1(0, Xξ)1{ξ≤θ∧T}
]
≤ sup
K∈A0
E0
[
− I0 + e−ρθψ0(ε)1l{θ<T∧ξ} + e−ρξv1(0, Xξ)1{ξ≤θ∧T}
]
≤ sup
K∈A0
E0
[
− I0 + e−ρθ(v0(0) + (
1
1− κ0
− η)ε)1l{θ<T∧ξ} + e−ρξv1(0, Xξ)1{ξ≤θ∧T}
]
≤ v0(0)− ηε+ sup
K∈A0
E0
[
− I1 + e−ρθ
1
1− κ0
Xθ1l{θ<T∧ξ} + e
−ρξv1(0, Xξ)1{ξ≤θ∧T}
]
≤ v0(0)− ηε+ sup
K∈A0
E0
[ ∫ θ∧T∧ξ
0
e−ρt
(
µ(Xt)− ρXt
1− κ0
+ λv1(0, ε)
)
dt
]
≤ v0(0)− ηε+ C sup
K∈A0
E0[θ],
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for some C > 0.
Let K ∈ A0, X̌t =
∫ t
0
σ(Xs)dWs and θ̌ = inf{t ≥ 0 : X̌t ≥ ε}. Since X ≥ X̌, it is clear that
θ ≤ θ̌. Moreover,
ε2 = E
[
X̌θ̌
]2 ≥ σ2E [θ̌]
where σ = infx<D σ(x) > 0. Combining this result with the above inequalities, we find that
v0(0) ≤ v0(0)− ηε+ C ε
2
σ2
. By taking ε small enough, we find a contradiction.

Appendix B : Proof of Theorem 3.1
Let 0 < δ < min( κ
′
1+κ′
, κ0
1−κ0 ,
κ1
1−κ1 ) and h(x) = A + x where A ≥ max(δ,
1
ρ
(δ + supx(µ(x) −
ρx))). Direct calculation shows that ρh−Lh ≥ δ, and if 0 < γ < 1, then wγi := γh+(1−γ)wi,
(i = 0, 1) is a strict viscosity supersolution of 3.17-3.20:
γδ ≤ min
(
ρwγ0 − Lw
γ
0 − J (w
γ
0 , w
γ
1 ), 1l[0,D) + 1l[D,+∞)
[
(wγ0 )
′ − 1
1 + κ′
]
,
1
1− κ0
− (wγ0 )′
)
on S̊0, (5.56)
γδ ≤ min
(
ρwγ1 − Lw
γ
1 −
∂wγ1
∂ς
,
1
1− κ1
− ∂w
γ
1
∂x
)
on S̊1, (5.57)
γδ ≤ min
(
wγ1 ,
1
1− κ1
− ∂w
γ
1
∂x
)
on {0} × [0, δ], (5.58)
γδ ≤ min
(
wγ0 (0),
1
1− κ0
− (wγ0 )′(0)
)
, (5.59)
and uγi := −γh+ (1 + γ)ui, (i = 0, 1) is a strict viscosity subsolution of 3.17-3.20:
−γδ ≥ min
(
ρuγ0 − Lu
γ
0 − J (u
γ
0 , u
γ
1), 1l[0,D) + 1l[D,+∞)
[
(uγ0)
′ − 1
1 + κ′
]
,
1
1− κ0
− (uγ0)′
)
on S̊0, (5.60)
−γδ ≥ min
(
ρuγ1 − Lu
γ
1 −
∂uγ1
∂ς
,
1
1− κ1
− ∂u
γ
1
∂x
)
on S̊1, (5.61)
−γδ ≥ min
(
uγ1 ,
1
1− κ1
− ∂u
γ
1
∂x
)
on {0} × [0, δ], (5.62)
−γδ ≥ min
(
uγ0(0),
1
1− κ0
− (uγ0)′(0)
)
. (5.63)
Assume that
M := sup
(t,x)∈S,i=0,1
uγi (t, x)− w
γ
i (t, x) > 0.
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First, we note that
lim
x→∞
uγ0(x)− w
γ
0 (x) = −∞. (5.64)
This is due to the fact that w0 is a supersolution and u0 is a subsolution so that there exists
C > 0 such that w0(x) ≥ x1+κ′ and u0(x) ≤ C +
x
1+κ′
for x large enough. Hence we know
that M = uγi (t0, x0)− w
γ
i (t0, x0) for some (t0, x0) ∈ S and some i = 0, 1.
(a) Suppose i = 0. For ε > 0, define Φε(x, y) = uγ0(x)− w
γ
0 (y)− φε(x, y) with
φε(x, y) =
1
4
|x− x0|4 +
1
2ε
|x− y|2 + 1
1− κ0
(x− y).
For each ε > 0, the function Φε attains its maximum value Mε at some point (xε, yε) ∈
S0 × S0. Classical results in comparison theory for viscosity solutions show that by taking
a subsequence, we can assume that the sequence (xε, yε) converges to (x0, x0) as ε→ 0, and
lim
ε→0
|xε − yε|
ε
= 0. (5.65)
Consequently, Mε → M as ε → 0, and Mε > 0 for ε small enough. By Theorem 3.2 of [8],
there exist ξε, ζε ∈ R such that
((xε − yε)/ε+ (xε − x0)3 +
1
1− κ0
, ξε) ∈ J2,+u0(xε), (5.66)
((xε − yε)/ε+
1
1− κ0
, ζε) ∈ J2,−wγ0 (yε), (5.67)
and (
ξε 0
0 ζε
)
≤ D2φε(xε, yε) + ε(D2φε(xε, yε))2
which implies that
σ(xε)
2ξε − σ(yε)2ζε ≤ 3ε (σ(xε)− σ(yε))
2 − 6σ(xε)σ(yε)(xε − x0)2
+9σ(xε)
2(xε − x0)2 + 9εσ(xε)2(xε − x0)4
≤ C
ε
|xε − yε|2 + C(1 + x20)(|xε − x0|2 + |xε − x0|4).
If yε = 0, then by (5.59)
γδ ≤ min (wγ0 (yε),−(xε − yε)/ε) .
By sending ε to 0, we obtain a contradiction for ε small because of (5.65). If xε = 0, we find
−γδ ≥ min
(
uγ0(0),−(xε − yε)/ε− (xε − x0)3
)
.
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Therefore, when ε is small enough, uγ0(xε) ≤ −γδ. A contradiction arises from the fact that
wγ0 (yε) ≥ 0 but Mε = u
γ
0(xε) − w
γ
0 (yε) > 0. Consequently, x0 > 0 and xε, yε > 0 for ε large
enough.
By (5.60) and (5.66), we get
min
(
ρuγ0(xε)− µ(xε)pε −
1
2
σ(xε)
2ξε − J (uγ0(xε), u
γ
1(xε)),
1l[0,D) + 1l[D,+∞)(pε −
1
1 + κ′
),−(xε − yε)/ε− (xε − x0)3
)
≤ −γδ,
with pε = (xε − yε)/ε+ (xε − x0)3 + 11−κ0 . By sending ε to 0, we see that the only possibility
is
ρuγ0(xε)− µ(xε)pε −
1
2
σ(xε)
2ξε − J (uγ0(xε), u
γ
1(xε)) ≤ −γδ.
By (5.56) and (5.67), we also have
ρwγ0 (yε)− µ(yε)
(
(xε − yε)/ε+
1
1− κ0
)
− 1
2
σ(yε)
2ζε − J (wγ0 (yε), w
γ
1 (yε)) ≥ γδ.
Combining these last two inequalities, we get
ρ(wγ0 (yε)− u
γ
0(xε)) ≥ 2γδ + (µ(yε)− µ(xε))
(
(xε − yε)/ε+
1
1− κ0
)
− µ(xε)(xε − x0)3
+
1
2
σ(yε)
2ζε −
1
2
σ(xε)
2ξε + J (wγ0 (yε), w
γ
1 (yε))− J (u
γ
0(xε), u
γ
1(xε)).
The right side of this inequality converges to
2γδ + λ1l[0,D](w
γ
1 (x0, 0)− w
γ
0 (x0)− u
γ
1(x0, 0) + u
γ
0(x0))
which is bigger or equal to 2γδ since
uγ0(x0)− w
γ
0 (x0) = M ≥ u
γ
1(x0, 0)− w
γ
1 (x0, 0).
On the other hand, the left side converges to −ρM < 0, hence the contradiction.
(b) Suppose i = 1.
If t0 = δ or x0 = D, then
uγ1(t0, x0)− w
γ
1 (t0, x0) = (1− γ) max(u0(D)− (D − x0)/(1− κ1), 0)
−(1− γ) max(w0(D)− (D − x0)/(1− κ1), 0)− 2γh(x0)
≤ (1− γ) max(u0(D)− w0(D), 0)− 2γh(x0)
≤ max(uγ0(D)− w
γ
0 (D), 0).
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This is therefore equivalent to the case i = 0, x0 = D, which we have already treated.
We can therefore assume x0 < D and t0 < δ.
For ε > 0, define Φε(t, x, y) = uγ1(t, x)− w
γ
1 (t, y)− φε(t, x, y) with
φε(t, x, y) =
1
2
|t− t0|2 +
1
4
|x− x0|4 +
1
2ε
|x− y|2 + 1
1− κ1
(x− y).
For each ε > 0, the function Φε attains a maximum at (tε, xε, yε). By taking a subsequence,
we can assume that the sequence (tε, xε, yε) converges to (t0, x0, x0) as ε→ 0, and
lim
ε→0
|xε − yε|
ε
= 0.
For ε small enough, we can therefore assume xε, yε < D and tε < δ. By Theorem 8.3 of [8],
there exist bε, ξε, ζε ∈ R such that
(bε + 2(t− t0), (xε − yε)/ε+ (xε − x0)3 +
1
1− κ1
, ξε) ∈ J2,+u0(tε, xε),
(bε, (xε − yε)/ε+
1
1− κ1
, ζε) ∈ J2,−wγ0 (tε, yε),
and
σ(xε)
2ξε − σ(yε)2ζε ≤
C
ε
|xε − yε|2 + C(1 + x20)(|xε − x0|2 + |xε − x0|4),
as before. Furthermore, we can show that xε, yε > 0 for ε small enough. Therefore,
min
(
ρuγ1(xε)− µ(xε)p′ε −
1
2
σ(xε)
2ξε − bε − 2(t− t0),−(xε − yε)/ε− (xε − x0)3
)
≤ −γδ,
with p′ε = (xε − yε)/ε+ (xε − x0)3 + 11−κ1 , and
ρwγ0 (yε)− µ(yε)
(
(xε − yε)/ε+
1
1− κ1
)
− 1
2
σ(yε)
2ζε − bε,−(xε − yε)/ε
)
≥ γδ.
As before, we find a contradiction by sending ε to 0.

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